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The notion of forgiveness as elaborated by the contemporary French philosopher Olivier Abel is examined 
and distinguished from its contemporary and historical sources. 
　本論文では、現代フランスの哲学者オリヴィエ・アベルが詳細に論じた“赦し”の概念につ
いて考察し、現代および過去における認識との違いを明らかにする。
　The discursive opportunity or challenge to which the writings on forgiveness of contemporary French 
philosopher Olivier Abel respond is, above all, the transformation of the idea of forgiveness by means 
of various inﬂections of secularism: forgiveness minus the theocratic grip. Although Abel participates to 
some degree in the contemporary tendency to view forgiveness as a “secular” power that is necessary 
for the stable functioning of society, he does not de-theologize his discourse as strenuously as, for 
example, Hannah Arendt does.1 Abel aims to articulate philosophical and historical dignity for the notion 
of forgiveness. He writes that “supposedly extraordinary, rare and sublime forgiveness is often only an 
ordinary and universal obligation for survival, for every society.” 2 However, rather than consigning the 
“irretrievable” or “irreparable” to the Last Judgment, as Arendt does with respect to unforgivable offenses, 
Abel tries to take account of “the irreparable” within a certain economy of forgiveness. Abel argues that 
forgiveness can respond to two forms of “the tragic.” While the tragic of conflict concerns insoluble 
discord between parties that stems from their incompatible views, the tragic of the irreversible concerns 
the nature of historical memory and, in particular, the fact that many disputes are overdetermined in their 
causality and inherited from distant generations. Abel raises the question of the lack of clarity that may 
haunt any thought of forgiveness and thus put to doubt one’s very capacity to circumscribe it within a 
“scene,” which always entails recognized actors (the one who forgives, the one who is forgiven, etc.) and 
conventionally deﬁned acts of speech. As Abel remarks, in “most real historical situations,” 3 confusion 
reigns over the nature of the wrong, its causality or its author. In describing these complications, Abel 
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presents forgiveness as a solution, if not a type of “healthy” resignation, to the fact that the economy 
of debts to which forgiveness responds is partial and imperfect. With his idea of forgiveness as being 
that which enables one to overcome moral debt and forgetting, Abel is concerned, predominantly, with 
conceiving an ecology of memory. For Abel, memory — one’s “own” memory — should not remain 
egoistically focused on the misdeeds done to it alone. Rather, it should have a moral function of allowing 
one to imagine the suffering of others and a pedagogic function of drawing lessons from injuries witnessed 
or received. 
　To the two forms of the tragic, Abel offers two solutions, which are types of forgiving, that he contrasts 
with a conventional, “moral” forgiveness. Abel’s criticism of moral forgiveness is that it requires an 
unrealistic degree of clarity and that this clarity, in the rare cases in which it is established, reduces 
forgiveness to an economy of equivalent exchanges, which economy carries specific dangers. In an 
essay on the relations between history and forgiveness, Abel maintains that, in its striving to reestablish 
reciprocity, moral forgiveness “permits the furtherance of the law of retribution, and it knows that one 
can only forgive that which one can punish.” 4 For Abel, despite its universal moral function, “[t]his 
forgiveness presupposes a continuous causal temporality in which good and evil deeds [les biens et les 
maux] have assignable causes somewhere in the structure of the exchange.”5 Consequently, it maintains 
forgiveness in a logic of conditionality and exchange by striving to encompass that which at ﬁrst appears 
irretrievable and without retribution. Moral forgiveness is “a strategy not only for founding social order 
on reciprocity and exchange, but also for integrating into this ‘coherence’ of the world that which always 
exceeds the exchange: pain and more generally death, the irretrievable loss of all that cannot be called 
back.” 6 In a passage whose ﬁnal lines evoke the scene of ascetic angst imagined by Gouhier as a path 
to the possible realization of the infinite, Abel writes that this type of forgiveness relies upon a “final 
violence” that occurs within a strictly deﬁned, self-enclosed economy of exchange. 
It is thus a matter of discovering a “ﬁnal violence” that rectiﬁes [répare] the violence before. Two 
possibilities are thus presented: either punishment, which makes one pay for a moral fault by means 
of physical pain and thus reestablishes equivalence between the pain/evil undergone and the pain/
evil enacted [le mal subi et le mal agi]; or “to take upon onself,” to decide that the violence before 
was the last violence, to sacriﬁce one’s vengeance, in a sense, and render good for evil. In both 
cases, the punishment or forgiveness has a “magical” character: it is a sort of ethical repetition or 
enactment which “effaces” the physical pain/evil undergone.7 
For Abel, the most problematic assumption of this type of forgiveness, which he does not stigmatize or 
dismiss entirely, is that “it applies only to situations that are clear, or made clear by convention, or in 
which all practical conditions have been fulﬁlled: one can designate the victim and the guilty, the guilty has 
recognized his guilt and has asked for forgiveness, etc.” 8 It is in this, too, that it offers a closed economy 
of forgiveness. In this ﬁgure, “forgiveness recalls that every exchange is a contract, and that if the terms of 
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the contract are corrupted, the contract is voidable, and can be renewed.” 9 In other words, the identities or 
“practical conditions” are established from the outset and this makes the moral debt implied in the misdeed 
an object of exchange. This object of exchange, in turn, presumes an identity which already seems to offer 
that which forgiveness, in this sense, is meant to strive for as an end, namely, reciprocity — a reciprocity 
of perspectives and a reciprocity of power that render a debt by suspending a merited punishment. On 
Abel’s view, the problem with this limited economy is that 
in most real historical situations, one is confronted with insurmountable conﬂicts in which even 
the fault is not agreed upon, or with ancient and irreparable deeds, of which past generations were 
victims, situations in which the crime is too vast too be punished, or too overlapping with others 
for one to be able to isolate a simple causality.10
Nonetheless, when history itself does not obey a strict economy based on the identity of facts and mutual 
recognition of participants, forgiveness, Abel believes, still has a role to play. Forgiveness has a higher 
function than that of manipulating the closed economy of moral situations insofar as it can also address 
the overdetermined nature of historical causality and bring compromise to conﬂicts in which parties lack a 
common set of assumptions or interests. 
　Olivier Abel’s concern is that, when faced with such situations in which, he says, “history turns tragic 
[touche au tragique],” 11 forgiveness can be swallowed up by either a will to forget or a return to the 
restricted economy whose insistence on debt repayment may lead one either to seek revenge or to act out, 
and thus reproduce, the harm of which one was ﬁrst a victim. To avoid these dangers, Abel proposes two 
separate logics of forgiveness, two alternative means of confronting the “tragic.” The ﬁrst logic responds 
to the “tragic of conflict.” By this, Abel, who is indebted for this idea to Luc Boltanski and Laurent 
Thévenot’s work in De la justification on “economies of grandeur,” 12 means a history in which the 
memories of various “actors” are incompatible not only because the actors have separate viewpoints but 
also because they do not have “a common question that would make [them] contemporaries to one another, 
[and] because there is no possible exchange on the basis of a common principle.” 13 In this anachronistic 
conflict wherein “common temporality is itself broken,” “the exchange of memories, the exchange of 
payable debts, is impossible.” 14 The description of this conﬂict resonates with the questions of distinctness 
and silence, if only because the “memories” are incapable of justifying themselves and, in some cases, are 
unable to respond to questions one would put to them: 
There is a corporeity of the historical identities that makes them irresponsible, incapable at some 
point of justifying themselves; they have a corporeity that prevents them from responding to all 
questions. As if identity itself were preceded by a debt that is transcendental with respect to all 
the exchanges that had defined it, or by a forgetting that is vaster and more active than every 
remembrance. 15 
As insoluble as this conflict may appear, the “heterogeneity of language” that Abel has in mind 
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corresponds, in fact, only to different “forms of life” of which Abel, following Boltanski and Thévenot’s 
De la justification, cites, as an example, the difference between civic and commercial values. Thus, 
forgiveness aims to resolve the conflict by offering a “compromise.” The compromise must bring the 
different protagonists to accept that they “are not in the same language, in the same world, or in the same 
history.” 16 By accepting that they will never bridge the gaps between them on grounds which serve to 
justify their respective sets of claims, they enter a space of reciprocity in which forgiveness occurs as a 
byproduct of their compromise or constitutes the synchronized presentation of their anachronistic non-
relation. 
Forgiveness is here the virtue of compromise in the sense that it allows one to abandon the dispute, 
but without making a deﬁnitive judgment on the heart of the matter: it presupposes that... in the 
irremediable dispute between the two narrations or arguments one has tried to construct a sort of 
compromise that breaks with the interminable replaying of the two separate versions.17 
What Abel describes here resembles a kind of Christian universalism for which, in the end, all are 
forgiven, without distinction between wrongdoers and victims: “One accepts to forgive [On accepte de 
pardonner] without looking further into which roles will be played by one another in the scene: at bottom, 
there will be no more forgiver and no more forgiven.” 18 However, if it is to be assimilated to forgiveness 
in this way, the idea of a harmonious effacement of roles that occurs on “neutral” ground, which is to say, 
on ground that is a composite language, world, and history, raises a number of questions: Who, in such a 
neutral space, accepts to forgive? By whom is forgiveness accepted? By whom is it offered? And following 
what misdeed? What makes forgiveness a pertinent notion in the ﬁrst place? Does a “heterogeneity” of 
perspectives alone call for forgiveness? Could forgiveness occur in a scene in which it is the stated aim? 
Must these identities be effaced or unknown as such for forgiveness to occur? 
　Perhaps some light can be thrown on these questions if one considers the use Abel makes of Boltanski 
and Thévenot’s De la justiﬁcation, on the one hand, and of Hegel, on the other. Concerning the ﬁrst, it 
is signiﬁcant that Boltanski and Thévenot explicitly put compromise in the service of a greater good. In 
incorporating Boltanski and Thévenot’s idea of compromise, Abel thus describes a notion of forgiveness 
that, in the interest of forestalling recriminations and violence, renders all participants anonymous, and all 
speciﬁc claims and identities, not to mention time frames, subordinate to the demands of appeasement and 
compromise. As Boltanski and Thévenot explain, 
This objective [of compromise] is realized by seeking the general interest, which is to say, not 
only the interest of the engaged parties but also the interest of those who are not affected by the 
agreement... Compromise suggests the possible discovery of a principle capable of rendering 
compatible judgments that are based on objects belonging to different worlds [of justiﬁcation].19
Boltanski and Thévenot’s study aims at overcoming the problems of cultural relativism by identifying 
demands that are common to conﬂicting or disparate economies or systems of justiﬁcation, each of which 
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remains justiﬁable in its own terms. Abel develops his notion of forgiveness in light of their study while 
striving — unconvincingly, I think — to demarcate this notion from a Hegelian conception of forgiveness, 
in which two parties renounce their respective claims to self-sufﬁciency and join one another in a higher 
purpose. Specifically, in The Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel accredits forgiveness (Verzeihung) with 
the task of establishing a general dialectic of recognition and thus equality with the other as means to 
concretize moral conscience. 20 In Verzeihung, which signiﬁes mutual forgiveness and recognition between 
the Beautiful Soul and the Acting Conscience, Spirit, as the manifest intersubjective unity, ﬁnds that its 
two opposing, paradigmatic spirits are reconciled, and that this brings about the “phenomenal presence of 
a spiritual totem... [wherein] [a]bsolute Spirit is explicitly present in the world, appearing necessarily in the 
midst of the mutually reconciled consciousness.” 21 This process of reconciliation, moreover, is predicated 
upon the essential sameness of the other: “With Hegel, the other is always the other of the same, belonging 
necessarily to the movement of the exteriorization, of the alienation of the same, balanced by a return 
movement of the other towards the same across the different states of the process. Thus, the opposition and 
its play remain within the same, the other being always in solidarity with it.” 22 The problems of identity 
and indistinctness raised by Abel at the outset are thus assumed to be resolved through a reconciliation 
like the one which occurs between the Beautiful Soul and the Acting Conscience (which distinction 
loosely parallels the conventional opposition of the unconditional and conditional, insofar as the former 
indicates universality; and the latter, particularity). It is signiﬁcant, moreover, that the “same” of the scene 
in which the Beautiful Soul and the Acting Conscience are reconciled is assured by language: “The Word 
of reconciliation is the objectively existent Spirit, which immediately apprehends the pure knowledge of 
itself qua universal essence in its opposite... a reciprocal recognition which is Absolute Spirit.” 23 The word 
of “reconciliation” [Das Wort der Versöhnung] is the word by means of which reconciliation is enjoined.24 
In other words, a common language serves as a minimal assurance of reconciliation, whether or not what 
is spoken in language strives explicitly to reconcile, forgive, or heal. Similarly, for Abel, the compromise 
between different worlds is delivered by means of a composite language [un mixte entre plusieurs langues].25 
However “mixed” or “composite,” such language assures that the “other” in Abel’s formulations is never 
entirely other. Thus, the “heterogeneity” of which he speaks is only a play of opposites within the same. It 
is a soft or provisional difference which is tempered or neutralized for the sake of a common good. 
　The idea of a common good, for which forgiveness would be employed in such an economy bent towards 
compromise and reconciliation, is clearly at odds with a rigorous notion of unconditional forgiveness. The 
reason I return to this point is not to impose the idea of unconditional forgiveness dogmatically upon Abel’s 
or Boltanski and Thévenot’s respective projects; rather, it is because Boltanski and Thévenot themselves 
seem to be aware of its demands. This is apparent in a passage from De la justiﬁcation that Abel does 
not refer or allude to in which Boltanski and Thévenot write explicitly about forgiveness. Boltanski and 
Thévenot seem, in their own way, convinced of the difficulty of allowing forgiveness to enter into the 
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sort of explicitly negotiated exchange of language that is implied in their own idea of compromise. They 
portray forgiveness as a renunciation of all form of judgment, as a “movement,” and as an “emotion.” For 
Boltanski and Thévenot, if one tries to justify forgiveness in language, forgiveness gets swept up into an 
alienating generalization; consequently, rather than result from or necessarily serve a principle of higher 
good, forgiveness, in their view, remains dependent on the presence of the individuals between which it 
occurs and thus can never be applied to a given situation as a generalizable principle: 
The expression of forgiveness in emotion rules out [repousse] the use of language which always 
carries the threat of comparison [rapprochement] and, particularly, of language at work in the 
rendering of facts [procès-verbal] orientated towards the proof of evidence... Forgiveness can only 
take place in the presence of persons and is thus not generalizable. Action resumes after forgiveness 
without the consequences of the crisis having been drawn and without the lessons gained by 
inquiry, or possibly, by judgment, having been exploited [mis à proﬁt].26 
Perhaps Boltanski and Thévenot mean to suggest that this form of silently expressed “emotion” that is 
ungeneralizable and limited to the scene in which it occurs and in the presence of those to whom it is 
directly relevant is, like their idea of compromise, based on the “aim of a good that is of a higher level than 
the forms of the common good that it brings together.”  However, if that were the case, their comments 
would suggest a much more fragile notion of forgiveness than what Abel describes as a response to the 
“tragic of conﬂict.” Being ungeneralizable and resisting even “the use of language,” forgiveness would 
remain an unveriﬁable hypothesis and depend on the presence of a given set of “protagonists,” that is, 
on the “who” and the “what” of any scene in which forgiveness is thought to occur. Nonetheless, this 
restriction is not without its problems. 
　Insisting upon the “presence” of those concerned as a condition for forgiveness is similar to Arendt’s 
deﬁning the “faculty of forgiveness” as being dependent upon “the condition of plurality.” Although, in 
one passage, Boltanski and Thévenot mark their skepticism about the idea that forgiveness must occur 
in or by means of language, both of these conditions — presence, or, in Arendt’s case, plurality — are 
aimed at keeping forgiveness from being the affair of a single individual. For these authors, forgiveness 
cannot be self-reflexive. One can never forgive oneself. In the case of Arendt’s reflections, one might 
question the very possibility of our ever “being closed within ourselves,” which condition, she says, 
signals the impossibility of forgiving and promising. As we have seen, for Arendt, forgiving and promising 
are social phenomena that save individuals from isolation and assure them their freedom and identity, 
which means, in short, their humanity. To be “closed within ourselves,” outside of action and speech, 
would be to resemble automatons that are pushed to and fro by the forces of a reactionary and obsessive 
vengeance. (It is not clear, in Arendt’s account, if this ever occurs or it if even poses a threat of occurring.) 
Without action and speech, there would result not only solipsism, but the inability to act creatively; that 
is, to act in a way that is not pure reaction or repetition of a previous act. As for Boltanski and Thévenot’s 
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assertion, the questions of an evil done, of the negative consequences it may have produced, and of 
the person or persons whom it has affected and of who may therefore question whether another can 
be forgiven, are not questions that can be circumscribed with the simple recourse to “presence.” This 
is especially true when one considers that, even if I, as the one harmed or offended, ﬁnd myself alone, 
for instance, in a room, face-to-face with my persecutor, I cannot speak without appealing to the other 
in and of language. And this other “other” corrupts the presumed intimacy and directness that holds in 
the face-to-face relation by, notably, giving the scene over to the structurally necessary, unavoidable 
possibility of repetition, exportation, generalization and parody. Moreover, from Boltanski and Thévenot’s 
characterization of forgiveness, it follows that, insofar as it is defined as a relation of “presence,” 
which implies the exclusive, mutually and self-comprehending consciousness and recognition of two 
persons (in both senses of the word “recognition”), forgiveness cannot be subsumable entirely to a 
larger framework of justiﬁcation, whether the framework is deﬁned by the “common good” or any other 
teleological requirement for the healthy functioning of society. Since Boltanski and Thévenot seek in De la 
justiﬁcation to found agreements on “a form of generality that [they] call a common superior principle,” 28 
if one were to add the conventional requirement for forgiveness that a misdeed has been done willfully, 
then if the roles, and thus the “presence” of the “forgiver” and the “forgiven” are also effaced as they 
are in Abel’s characterization of “compromise,” can one still speak of “forgiveness?” Boltanski and 
Thévenot’s skeptical characterization of forgiveness appears to violate their very concept of compromise 
by resisting its movement to a generalized, and generalizable, neutral ground. It is perhaps not surprising, 
then, that in developing his idea of forgiveness as social compromise, Abel gives full weight to their idea 
of compromise and none to their idea of forgiveness. However, the idea of compromise as he develops 
it instrumentalizes forgiveness by submitting it to a higher principle and reinscribing it into a limited 
economy that resembles what Abel had hoped to displace or marginalize under the name of “moral 
forgiveness.” Nonetheless, this tension is already present in De la justiﬁcation. 
　Whereas in some of the characterizations that Boltanski and Thévenot make, unspeakable, 
ungeneralizable forgiveness, which is dependent for its existence on the presence of those whom it 
concerns, can ﬁnd no neutral language or principle of higher good that would not destroy it; in others, it is 
reduced to a form of forgetting. This equivocalness evidently stems from Boltanski and Thévenot wanting 
to neutralize aspects of forgiveness that seem to present a threat to the harmonious resolution of conﬂict. 
It is perpetuated in other assertions in which the authors state that the “movement of forgiveness opens the 
possibility of a forgetting that allows one to avoid the work of totalizing past actions that is necessary for 
judgment... More surely than judgment, forgiveness marks a clean break with the inquiry by disqualifying 
it.” 29 If one forgets the misdeed, and disqualiﬁes any looking into it, then, according to any conventionally 
understood notion of forgiveness, one has not forgiven; one has simply forgotten. 
　It might be helpful at this point to recall, again, the canonical distinction between forgiving and 
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forgetting that Abel himself draws upon. As Haddon Willmer argues in his entry on “forgiveness” in the 
Oxford Companion to Christianity, forgiveness involves some element of forgetting but is not itself a form 
of forgetting. In the following lines from the same entry, Abel’s basic argument can also be recognized, as 
well as the idea of an “art of forgetting.” In forgiving, only a certain type of memory — a memory of evil 
that disempowers the evil remembered — which is to say, a hygienic memory, is called upon, established, 
or restored. As Willmer says, 
Forgiving, as pardon of guilt or remission of debt, liberates from the past. This liberation is 
sometimes seen as analogous to forgetting: God in forgiving ‘remembers your sin no more.’ Some 
forgetting is inevitable in human life; it may preserve sanity and to some degree support forgiving, 
but it is not a clue to its essence: forgiving is always a way of reckoning truthfully with what is 
wrong and hence is a way of remembering, in which the past wrong is not denied but deprived 
of its power to shape the future. It is not pure remembering, in which the past stays with us, but a 
remembering which enables the transformation of the past so that it no longer destroys joy, peace, 
and love... When forgiving is effective, evil is remembered, but no longer sets the agenda for the 
future or consumes peoples’  lives. Where forgiveness is understood as intrinsic to reconciliation, 
remembering is especially inescapable, for the persons reconciled do not have identity without 
memory.30  
It is clear in Abel’s discussion of the irreversibility of the consequences of our actions, which is the second 
type of conﬂict to which he says forgiveness responds, that Abel views forgiveness not as a forgetting or 
disqualiﬁcation, pure and simple, of a misdeed or harm, but as a hygienic and pedagogic form of memory 
that frees one from both resentment and thoughts of debts unpaid and conserves important lessons for the 
future. This constitutes Abel’s explanation for how, in forgiving, one can break with both the debt and 
forgetting. Abel argues, in a conventional way, that forgetting exposes one to the risk of repeating the 
traumatic past. Wishing to protect against such repetition, he describes forgiveness as constituting a certain 
modality of forgetting that releases one from a debt owned to oneself and opens one to debts owned to 
others. For Abel, the debt that is tied to a traumatic and resentful memory “makes it impossible for one to 
act anew.” It thus excludes from one’s engagements anything that could offer a different perspective. This 
leads Abel to describe a forgiveness whose partial forgetting makes it unable to say all that had ﬁrst called 
for it.   
In designating the irreparable, the intraitable, that which cannot be entirely put into words, 
forgiveness (in conformity with its probable etymology) accepts that there is loss, debts that are no 
longer debts, and possibilities that are no longer possibilities. It undertakes this work of mourning 
without which there would be no work of giving birth or of the possible resurrection of another 
present.31  
What Abel means by the intraitable is described not in terms of the horror of any particular crime but, 
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rather, as a problem of “ethical identity.” This problem stems from the fact that  
our acts are detached from our ﬁrst intentions, become autonomous, and completely escape us. The 
immediate ethical circle by means of which what the agent does corresponds to what the patient 
undergoes... is so completely stretched here that ethical responsibility becomes problematic. This 
is a zone in which I am irresponsibly responsible for the unintended and sometimes unforeseeable 
consequences of my actions.32  
Stating that “there is loss” thus describes a situation that precedes the responsible subject’s decision to 
forgive or not to forgive, rather than the consequence of the subject’s taking a costly initiative to render 
forgiveness where none is merited. 
　The overdetermined nature of the scenes in which forgiveness is summoned to play its part is, for Abel, 
what makes the scenes “tragic.” Overdetermined circumstances of pain or injury lead to some degree of 
loss — one can’t identify the wrongdoer or wrongdoers, one forgets the circumstances of misdeeds and 
their consequences — and to the “tragic” of this situation forgiveness responds by not insisting on the 
repayment of the most traumatic debt. There are too many debts, and the debtors are too ill-deﬁned, for 
one to have to take the most painful debt to heart. However, rather than simply canceling all debts, which 
would be an obvious form of forgetting, one keeps in circulation debts that are less debilitating, debts 
that are more general and anonymous and less likely to make one’s memory morbid; for Abel, this means 
debts that are owed by us to others for overdetermined reasons and not debts that are owed to us by those 
who have harmed us in a determinate way. The plurality of debts, which involves our own memories but 
foremost the memories of others (in both senses of the genitive), now becomes the “intraitable”: 
Far from blessing the forgetfulness [that consists in scapegoating others for wrongs of the past], 
forgiveness breaks with it. It breaks with the ordinary world in which everything is forgotten 
without ever being paid for or forgiven. It reopens memory, it ‘recalls’ the debt — no longer that 
which could be paid back, but the unmanageable debt [la dette intraitable] towards those from 
whom we have received everything, those from whom we have taken everything, those to whom 
all of this will be passed on.33  
Breaking with the ordinary world, for Abel, thus means overcoming the risk of a “morbid memory” [une 
mémoire malade] that is “unable either to forget or to efface, and thus incapable of remembering anything 
else.” 34 In the morbid memory, one traumatic event pushes out, and clouds over, all other memories, 
thus making all memories appear in the same morbid light. Overcoming morbidity requires the difﬁcult 
establishment of an economy or ecology of memory. This is achieved by altering one’s identity. To be able 
to “discern vital forgetting from facile amnesia,” forgiveness must alter the identity of the one who would 
forgive: 
Here and there forgiveness must introduce an alteration in identity itself, to assert that identity 
is not the only important thing in life; it dis-identifies [désidentifie], it also frees one from an 
鹿児島県立短期大学紀要　第 66号（2015）
− 28−
excessive obsession with identity. With it, memory is no longer the interminable narrative of the 
past, or more exactly the interminable guarantee of an identity; but the memory of other things 
past, and thus of other things possible.35  
There are reasons for questioning whether such an alteration should be called forgiveness. What Abel 
describes here is the willful, conscious, calculated exchange of a traumatic event in memory for other, less 
traumatic debts. The exchange recalls Hannah Arendt’s view that forgiveness amounts to changing one’s 
mind, to diverting it from trespasses to new initiatives and actions. Abel’s solution to conﬂict is partly a 
strategy for coping much like that described as forgiveness by Arendt, but, as we have seen, it also has 
elements of Hegel’s notion of forgiveness (Verzeihung), despite Abel’s attempt to demarcate his conception 
from that of Hegel. This is seen in Abel’s depiction of forgiveness according to Hegel: 
For Hegel, forgiveness is precisely that which terminates the ethical cycle begun by the tragic. 
Yet Hegelian forgiveness depends on each party’s renunciation of its particularity. That is to say, 
it depends on reciprocal withdrawal [désistement], on the acceptance by the protagonist of his 
disappearance as a self-identical being, on the consent of the forgiver and the forgiven to become 
other than himself. 36 
Similarly, even though Abel defines “the tragic” as the fact of “not being able to become other than 
oneself,” 37 the “others” within the economy are forced to inhabit “a mixture of several languages.” 38 Abel 
adds to this an explanation that echoes Hegel’s remark on das Wort der Versöhnung, which is that “the 
words that announce forgiveness, while refusing the clarity of a situation wherein one is the forgiver and 
the other is a forgiven, are fragile words.” 39 The fragility of the words is shared by identities made fragile. 
To the impossibly overdetermined scene in which no clear identity emerges as being fully at fault, one 
thus substitutes other candidates for indebtedness, even if this entails dividing, displacing, and diminishing 
one’s own identity and dispersing one’s attention among the many. Nonetheless, the healthy memory, it 
seems, in this way only returns one to the initial state of over-determination. Thus, Abel’s idea of breaking 
with the debt and forgetting only argues for the most conservative of motivations. Even as it accounts 
for the fact that, within the economy, there is loss, it neutralizes particular claims so as to maintain the 
harmony of the economy of exchange as a whole. Consequently, in light of the solutions proposed by 
Abel, it is unclear how fault can be attributed to any of the not wholly responsible actors in such scenes. 
Moreover, it is unclear how forgiveness is implied, or warranted, in what Abel describes as the tragic of 
the irreparable. The solutions return one to the overdetermined, indistinct economy in which identities 
are reduced and a general state of general excusability reigns. Thus, despite the fact that he identities 
that which by its indistinctness or overdetermination resists being managed within a strict economy of 
exchange, Abel reintroduces, via the detour of Hegel’s Verzeihung, on the one hand, and Boltanski and 
Thévenot’s idea of “economies of grandeur,” on the other, a notion of forgiveness that redistributes the 
“tragic” economy in such a way that it becomes a relatively stable one. As such, the essentially limited 
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and calculated nature of the economy remains unchanged. In such an economy, the “proper” of one’s own 
memory is traded in for the alterity of others’  memories. Moreover, this occurs for the sake of a general 
memory that one assumes is, on balance, non-obstructive, well-adjusted, univocal and hale. For Abel, 
forgiveness responds to the tragic overdetermination of moral situations with a strategy for enhancing 
the presumed cohesion of a community or group; it is a process engaged for a greater good in which one 
swaps traumatic memories and overdetermined scenes of wrongdoing for the sake of memories unpleasant 
that, with adjustments, seem manageable.  
(Essay received October 1, 2015)
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